The author upholds Anna Wierzbicka's opinion that unless strict scientific definitions of performatives are reached, no successful classification of these verbs can be made. The article compares definitions of the verb elect and four performative verbs (appoint, declare, excommunicate and pronounce) as presented in four English dictionaries, as well as in the form of Wierzbicka's explicatives and the author's formulations reached by means of the collocational method. This method seeks to gain a realistic insight into the semantic structure of lexemes because most metalinguistic elements are drawn from facts offered by the language itself. The definitions of the performative verbs, like of any other verb, can be marshalled by combining and incorporating semantic definitions of the collocating grammar words and constructions. The latter task is done by extracting the common content of the grammar words and constructions in the relevant meanings as appearing in collocations of their own. The same procedure is carried out for the noun collocates occurring in the subject and object slots of the verbs in question. The performative force within this small lexical field manifests gradation, depending on the presence of a person in authority.
Introduction
Research into speech acts belongs in pragmatics, text-linguistics, and conversational analysis. Owing to their nature, speech act verbs cannot be thoroughly analyzed without inspecting their pragmatic use. This holds good to a lesser degree for the entire lexis, but since there are performative verbs used exclusively or typically to perform speech acts, their investigation comes within the scope of semantics as well. There must be a common core to their usage in speech, which can be revealed from a semantic point of view yielding diagnostic, lexical definitions. Although the mainstream approach to performative verbs in linguistics has been pragmatic (with the exception of important studies by Anna Wierzbicka), we shall concentrate solely on the semantic side, with the aim to show that the company these verbs keep (paraphrasing Firth's famous saying), is a good guide to their essence.
Aims
The purpose of this investigation is (1) to find scientific lexicological definitions for four performative verbs and one approximating them, and (2) (Rundell 2007; hereafter M) , as well as to Anna Wierzbicka's explicatives. Wierzbicka has elaborated a method of creating explications, a kind of definitions derived from simple ordinary language, which are meant to highlight the most important, invariant meaningful elements of particular words (e.g., Wierzbicka 1972 Wierzbicka , 1980 Wierzbicka , 1985 Wierzbicka , 1987 Wierzbicka , 1988 . Occasionally, she resorts to collocations, well aware that " [t] he meaning of a word can often be illuminated by the other words which it tends to co-occur with" (Wierzbicka 1987: 210) .
We are going to work our way through semantic definitions of the verbs appoint, declare, pronounce, and excommunicate. These verbs are related to " [s] peech acts that bring about the state of affairs they name […] : bids, blessings, firings, baptisms, arrests, marrying, declaring a mistrial.
[…] The verbs include bet, declare, baptize, name, nominate, pronounce" (Kreidler 1998 : 185, who calls them "performative" in a narrower sense than usual). These speech act verbs belong in the "exercitive" group of Austin's performative verbs, with the exception of declare in one meaning, which was classified as "commissive" (Austin 1962) , while Searle (1969 Searle ( , 1976 classified them as "declarations". Wierzbicka assigns appoint to the permit group, excommunicate to the baptize group, and the rest to the declare group. For the sake of a more graphic comparison the verb elect has been added to the group although it is not on the list of Austin's and Wierzbicka's speech act verbs.
Since we have decided to analyze only sememes with a performative function or verging thereon, other meanings of appoint ('decide on a time/place'), declare ('tell that one owns taxable property'), and pronounce ('utter') will not be treated here.
The collocational method
In this study we shall proceed from the collocational approach. A systematic investigation into collocation as a means to produce semantic definitions was presented in Hlebec (2008 Hlebec ( a, b, c, 2011 Hlebec ( a, b, 2012 Hlebec ( , 2013 . The customary collocational-method procedure that we are going to follow is this: (1) determine polysemy when present and concentrate on each sememe separately, (2) identify grammar words and content words as the collocators of the particular verb sememe, and (3) provide the content of the collocators that agree with the chosen sememe in order to use it as a source for definitions. Unacceptable collocations also serve as clues to defining (cf. Wierzbicka 1987: 20) .
Relevant content words in this case are nouns that function in the subject and object slots (i.e. as so called "directives" 2 in definitions), as well as the adverb seriously. The grammar words that have emerged as collocators are the following prepositions and conjunctions: against (collocating with declare, pronounce 2), among (collocating with elect), as (in agreement with appoint and elect), between (with elect), by (with all), for (with declare and pronounce 1), from (two meanings, with excommunicate and elect), on (declare and pronounce 2), that (declare 2, pronounce 2), to (appoint and elect), wh-word (declare). To be can be used as part of the complement with declare 1 and pronounce 2, and has to be used with declare 2. The patterns that occur are the non-finite clause (for appoint, declare, pronounce 2) and the formula I hereby + Present Simple Tense V (for appoint, declare, excommunicate and pronounce). A category that came up is to-infinitive (as a complement to appoint and elect). The demarcation within polysemy has been made by consulting dictionaries and by using the zeugma test (cf. Cruse 1986) . The metalanguage of definitions is simple and monosemic. Each of these grammar words and patterns was previously defined as follows, by capturing the invariant meaning recurrent in a number of their own collocations and restricted to the meaning relevant to this lexical field. [insult, slander, curse, abuse, scold, blame, rebuke, forgive, pardon, praise, thank, congratulate, compliment; tell NP off, pick on NP] -(ii) [accuse, excuse] and (iv) [cheer, applaud, apologise] may add specification of the way in which the attitude was revealed or the greeting affected, using by plus an NP or ING clause, 3 Explanation of the symbols used: sb sp the speaker of the utterance sb strong person with social power sb indef indefinite persons (see Hlebec 2013) sb weak person in a weak social position x, y, z sth different with the same designation sth something (including things, beings and phenomena) # # "directive", semantic content of a noun in subject and object functions < > semantic definition [ ] content proper of an adverb « » content of the prepositional object _ _ content proper of a conjunction within its definition ! ! content proper of an infinitive within its definition ____ (a) part of a preposition definition meant to replace the preposition or (b) a non-finite clause -alternative semes, with one metalinguistic unit exchanged for another / alternative semes exchanging elements with more than one metalinguistic unit { } typically 4 In this article the following implications (redundancy rules) are applicable: 'mental state' ⊃ 'thought', '' 'sb more than one' ⊃ 'group', 'living thing' ⊃ 'sb', 'experience' ⊃ 'know', 'experience mental phenomenon ⊃ 'come to know', 'phenomenon' ⊃ 'state' and ⊃ 'state' ⊃ 'position'. The feature 'being not a member' in excommunicate is a kind of 'state'. to be Some verbs in non-finite clauses may drop the complementiser to plus the following copula be (Dixon 2005: 53, 251-254) . The tendency to leave or drop to be is ruled by the relationship between the person in the subject and the person in the object. (1) When the influence of the subject is considerable, as in official decisions and judgements, to be is omitted, as in They voted him (*to be) president, where 'sb strong ' is realized as 'sb more than one ', prove sb (*to be) wrong or find sb (*to be) guilty. Meat exports must be certified free of disease. eclare and proclaim may omit to be when they are used in a performative sense" (Dixon 2005: 253) and "[T]o be can be omitted from a Judgement TO clause when the main clause verb and the adjective from the predicate of the complement clause typically belong together (e.g. declare X dead, proclaim X King, find X guilty) (254). The first of Dixon's statement is closer to pinpointing the essence of the phenomenon: when 'sbstrong' is in the subject slot, in an act of creation the power of sb strong 's words is fused with the state expressed by the adjective.
between (1) and (2), to be is optional: if the speaker wants the subject to figure as an authoritative person, to be will be left out. Otherwise to be will be used. these verbs, e.g. not from They proclaimed/declared him to be clever" (Dixon 2005: 253) . "In summary, to be can be omitted from a Judgement TO clause when the main clause verb and the adjective from the predicate of the complement clause typically belong together (e.g. declare X dead, proclaim X King, find X guilty)" (Dixon 2005: 254) . Semantic definition: <#sb x strong with administrative -political power # using language makes #sb y # come to be in a position of #sb strong with administrative -political power # because sb x wants sb y 's position to be used working for sb x/y strong , and makes sb indef experience mental state concerning sb y in the position of sb y strong as true and strong> 3 C's definition: If you appoint someone to a particular post or to do a particular job, you formally choose them for it or ask them to do it. H's definition: choose sb for a job or position of responsibility W II's definition: to select for an office or position M's definition: to choose someone to do a particular job or have a particular position Wierzbicka's explication: (a) I assume that someone should do, for some time, things of a certain kind (Y) (b) I think of these things (Y) as things that are good for people (c) I assume that I am someone who should say who should do these things (d) I say: I want person(/persons) X to do these things (e) I say this because I want to cause it to happen (f) I assume that by saying this I will cause it to happen (g) I want people to know this and to think of X as a person who should do things of this kind (Y)
Portraits of the verbs
The adverb seriously with the semes 'important -true and strong' tautologically repeats the information that appoint conveys invariantly by the semes 'true' and/or 'strong(ly)'. H's and M's definitions employ 'choose' as a defining hyperonym for appoint. Hayakawa (1969: 18) says that appoint "refers to a situation "in which a person is being chosen [by someone else] to fulfil a given function" and implies "an official situationin an office, club or government -in which the choice is made by means other than an elective process […] by someone officially charged with this duty". In Wierzbicka's explication there is no suggestion of making choice. One of the illustrative sentences above suggests that choosing is not necessarily implied by appoint since Caligula's act mentioned therein was a sheer whim rather than a considered decision as a result of selecting among candidates. At the same time, this example indicates that sb is 'sb' canonically, and that in perverse situations 'sb' can become an 'animal'. Neither does the collocational method indicate 'choose', because the grammatical collocations *appoint among/from are illformed, while choose, pick (out) and select can be followed by the prepositions among and from.
Line (a) of Wierzbicka's explication corresponds to 'want sb's position to be used' in our definition. The social role that is mentioned in our definition is implied by (b) since doing things [by sb] that are good for people [in a community] implies sb's social role, (c) refers to sb with power, (d) is implied and perhaps redundant, (e) amounts to 'make', (f) mentions use of language in addition to 'make', while (g) echoes 'makes sb indef experience mental state concerning sb y in the position of sb strong as true'. Wierzbicka comments that components (e), (f) and (g) of her explication spell out the 'performativeness', or the effectiveness of the speech act, and also the public nature of the act.
The feature 'using language to sb indef ' is submerged in all the dictionaries by choose/select. 'Be in a position' corresponds to C's "to a particular post or to do a particular job", to H's "for a job or position of responsibility", W II's "for an office or position", and M's "to do a particular job or have a particular position". (a) I say: I want people to know that they should think X (b) I say this because I want to cause people to know what they should think (about Y) (c) I assume that I am someone who can cause people to think X by saying this in this way (d) I assume that nothing anyone could say could change this (e) I assume it is important that I have said this (f) I assume that after I have said this, in this way, people have to do some things because of that C's and W II's "to state officially", H's 'to say sth publicly' and M's 'to announce' fail to highlight the causative element 'make', and in contrast with Wierzbicka's explicit "cause", in dictionaries it is only implied. M's 'that something is true' and C's "exists or is the case" equal our 'as true'. Wierzbicka's 'X' is too vague to cover 'be in a state', while her 'I say this because I want to cause people to know' corresponds to 'using language makes sb strong come to know'. (a) I say: I want people to know that they should think X (b) I say this because I want to cause people to know what they should think (about Y) (c) I assume that I am someone who can cause people to think X by saying this in this way (d) I assume that nothing anyone could say could change this (e) I assume it is important that I have said this
In this meaning, according to Dixon (2005: 276) , declare belongs in the REPORT subtype of the verbs of speaking. Austin (1971: 155 -157 ) also makes a difference between an exercitive (= declare 1, as in declare closed/open) and a commissive declare (= declare 2 in declare my intention and declare for). Wierzbicka (1987: 349) states that declare 1 differs from declare 2 in having one extra component (f), which accounts for the performative use of declare 1, but also that even the speakers of declare 2 conduct themselves "as if they had the authority to formulate a view which would bind everyone. [… T]he speaker who declares something feels quite confident that by saying what he wants to be the case (or what he wants to be accepted) he can cause it to be the case (he can cause it to be accepted) […] The illocutionary force of declaring is [(b)]" (Wierzbicka 1987: 348) . She notices that declare 2 takes that-clause and has a truth value unlike declare 1. The verb declare in I declare my intention of marrying Jane is, according to Wierzbicka, declare 1, while in I declare that I intend to marry Jane it belongs to declare 2, although the difference between declare 1 and declare 2 is slight (350). For the comment on declare and other "declaratives" see Ross 1970. Wierzbicka's feature (a) is matched by 'make sb indef come to know'. C's 2 and Wierzbicka's definitions for declare 2 do justice to '#sb x # using language makes sb come to know'. The importance of what is declared 2, which is explicitly stated in Wierzbicka's (e), corresponds to our 'strongly'. Dictionaries present the 'strongly' as "firmly", "clearly", "emphatically" or "especially in an impressive way". : among, as, between, by, from, to (prep.) , to-infinitive, *to be, *I/we hereby, ??seriously Semantic definition: <#sb x more than one # using symbols make #sb y # come to be in a position of #sb strong with social -religious power # working for sb x/y more than one having socialreligious power , when the source of making sb y be in a position is sb z more than one , because (most) sb x 's want so, and make sb indef experience mental state concerning sb y 's position as strong> Unlike appoint, the verb elect can be followed by among or from, and has choose as its hyperonym. One may fight/win/lose elections because there are a number of candidates among which a choice is made. Since electing is done collectively by individual voting, I/We hereby elect is not possible. The phrase elect seriously is tautological. C's definition: When people elect someone to represent them, they choose him or her to act as their representative, by voting. H's definition: to chose sb to do a particular job by voting for them W II's definition: to choose by vote, as for an office M's definition: to choose someone by voting so that they represent you or hold an official position C and M stress the representative role of the person elected, but this role may be typical rather than an invariant feature. It does not correspond to our 'position working for sb x/y more than one having social -religious power '. To be elected to Parliament is not 'to be elected to represent Parliament' but to work for Parliament, with members representing particular groupings of people.
Clues
excommunicate Examples: e. from the church/religious community (by saying a formula) Clues: by, from; I hereby; *to be, *seriously, *jokingly, *non-finite clause; ??e. without words, *e. without anybody knowing about the excommunication Semantic definition: <#sb x strong with religious power # using language strongly makes #sb y # be not a member of religious group any longer because sb y did sth bad, and makes sb indef take state concerning sb y as true> C's definition: if a Roman Catholic is excommunicated, it is publicly and officially stated that the person is no longer allowed to be a member of the Roman Catholic Church. This is punishment for some very great wrong that they have done. H's definition: to punish sb by officially stating that they can no longer be a member of a Christian Church, especially the Roman Catholic Church W II's definition: To deprive of the right of church membership by ecclesiastical authority M's definition: to officially say that someone can no longer be a member of the Roman Catholic Church because they have done something that breaks the rules of the Church Wierzbicka's explication:
(a) I assume you know that you are doing something that the Church says is bad (b) I assume that you don't want to stop doing it (c) I want people to understand that the Church can't say that people who are part of the Church can do it (d) I say: I want people not to think of you as someone who is a part of the Church (e) I want you not to be able to do things that people who are part of the Church can do (f) I assume I can cause these things to happen by saying this because the Church wants me to be able to cause this to happen (g) I say this because I want to cause it to happen (h) I assume that it will happen because of that (i) I assume you understand that it will be bad for you (I assume people will understand that after I have said this in this way you can't do things as if I hadn't said it)
In various ways C's, H's and M's definitions can be understood to imply causation as a match for 'make' in our definition (by "not allow", "punish(ment)", "can no longer be a member"). Wierzbicka leaves no doubt about the causal character of these speech acts, while W II makes use of the causative verb deprive. The feature 'strong with power' has been indirectly covered by means of "officially" in three dictionaries, and directly by "authority" (W II), while "church" corresponds to 'religious". The patterns for the definitions of pronounce 1 and 2 are basically the same: '#sb# using language makes sb indef experience (#)sb x 's mental phenomenon x (#) concerning phenomenon y '. How much is the difference between 'phenomenon' and 'state' in pronounce 1 and 2 warranted is a matter of further investigation requiring a larger corpus. The only striking difference is '#sb x strong with legal -medical power ' together with 'experienced by sb y/2 as true and strong' of pronounce 1, which is slightly echoed by 'strongly using language' in pronounce 2. So there do seem to be some grounds for justifying lumping the two meanings into one lexicographic definition. Pronouncing involves saying something in an authoritative way. "Prototypically, a judge pronounces a judgment or a sentence about a person" (Wierzbicka 1987: 350) . "Rather than splitting pronounce into two meanings […] , it might be justified to formulate the idea of 'judgment' more vaguely: perhaps we should say that the speaker wants to say something about X which will cause people to know what they should think about X, i.e. that he wants to enable them to form a 'correct' and binding view about X. In practice, this will frequently mean a vague judgment, but not necessarily so" (Wierzbicka 1987: 351) . When distinguishing between the meaning of pronounce and that of declare, she says that declare refers to certain states of affairs (= our '#state#'), not to certain entities, while pronounce always refers to a person or an entity (= our '#sb x 's#'), not to a state of affairs. "Even when one declares a man dead, or a food contaminated, one is implying the whole proposition ('this man is dead', 'this food is contaminated') […] For this reason, one can't pronounce war, and one can't pronounce a meeting closed […] Presumably this is the reason why one usually doesn't pronounce that, as one can declare that: that introduces a proposition and allows almost any proposition, whereas pronounce usually requires an entity (a direct object) and a predicative which represents a verdict upon that entity(as in "They pronounced him guilty"). Furthermore, pronounce implies an element of voluntary and somewhat arbitrary decision […] If a man is pronounced dead rather than declared dead, an element of judgment seems to be more 'pronounced' than it is the case of declare. " (351). In continuation Wierzbicka draws attention to the fact that pronounce can be followed by on, which in one of its meanings implies an area of expertise (She lectured on linguistics/*on Mary).
Again, in C's, H's, W II's and M's definitions causation is only implied, while Wierzbicka is quite explicit in this respect. The speaker's mental state featuring in our definition of pronounce is also vaguely suggested by H's and M's, and explicitly treated in Wierzbicka's explication.
Conclusion
Stated in definitional terms, the common meaning of all the meanings of our four speech act verbs is '#sb x # using language makes sb y/indef be in/experience a state'. In other words, they mean 'do something by using words', which echoes Austin's famous title. Their semantic definitions show that performativeness is a matter of degree. For one thing, definitions that contain sb strong in the subject position should be separated from those that have 'sb' without strong . Appoint is a performative of the first degree, having 'sb strong ' both in the subject and in one object. Excommunicate, pronounce 1 and declare 1 are with 'sb strong ' in the subject position. Elect is lower on the scale as it has 'sb more than one ' instead of 'sb strong ' in the subject, but the latter feature appears as the object. However, this amounts almost to the same thing because a group of people in a body is endowed with power. What makes elect less performative is the feature 'because declare 1 (person in authority) create a state by addressing the public, who have to accept the state seriously declare 2 to say in order to make people know what one seriously thinks about something elect (the majority of a group of competent people) chose someone among others to be a member of an authoritative group excommunicate to make someone be no longer a member of a Church by saying that officially pronounce 1 (person in authority) create an important state by saying publicly pronounce 2 to say in order to make people know what one seriously thinks about a state
Of course, such definitions would also have to be furnished with data on transitivity and the patterns these verbs enter into.
